Will Colleges Send Out Financial Aid Packages Earlier Next Year?

I’m looking forward to college students being able to submit the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) three months earlier next year. Instead of being able to submit starting January 1 for the 2017-18 academic year, students will be able to submit beginning October 1—giving students an additional three months to complete the form thanks to using ‘prior prior year’ (PPY) income and asset data. This means that students can get an estimate of their eligibility for federal grants and loans as soon as late fall, which has the potential to help inform the college choice process.

But there is no guarantee that students will get their final financial aid package from the college any earlier as a result of prior prior year. Recognizing this, Undersecretary of Education Ted Mitchell recently sent a letter to college presidents asking colleges to send out their aid packages earlier in order for students to fully benefit from PPY. Will colleges follow suit? I expect that some will, but the colleges with the greatest ability to offer institutional grant aid probably won’t. Below, I explain why.

The types of colleges that can easily respond to PPY by getting aid packages out earlier are those institutions with rolling admissions deadlines. (Essentially, it’s first-come, first-served among students who meet whatever admissions criteria are present—less-selective four-year and virtually all two-year colleges operate in this manner.) Some of these colleges already offer their own grant aid upon admission, but these colleges tend to have less grant aid to offer on account of relatively low sticker prices and fewer institutional resources. Additionally, these colleges often take applications well into the spring and summer—after students can already file the FAFSA under current rules.

It is less likely that the relatively small number of highly-selective colleges that get a disproportionate amount of media coverage will respond to PPY by getting financial aid offers out any earlier. For example, the Ivy League institutions didn’t even release their admissions notifications for students applying through the regular route until the last day of March, which gives students plenty of time to complete the FAFSA under current rules. Moving up the notification date to January is definitely feasible under PPY, but it requires students to apply earlier—and thus take tests like the ACT or SAT earlier. All students are supposed to commit to one college by May 1, giving students one month under current rules to compare aid packages and make a decision. Colleges may oppose extending this decision period as students have more time to compare offers and potentially request more money from colleges.

I suspect the Department of Education sent their letter to colleges in an effort to get the admissions notification dates at selective colleges moved up, but this goes against the incentives in place at some colleges to reduce the comparison shopping period. Prior prior year still allows students to get their federal aid eligibility earlier, which is a good thing. But for quite a few students, they won’t get their complete financial aid package any earlier.

Fewer Poor Students Are Being Enrolled in State Universities–Here’s Why

This post initially appeared at The Conversation, and is co-authored with my Seton Hall colleague Luke Stedrak.

States have traditionally provided funding for public colleges and universities based on a combination of the number of students enrolled and how much money they were allocated previously.

But, in the face of increasingly tight budgets and pressures to demonstrate their effectiveness to legislators, more and more states are tying at least some higher education funding to student outcomes.

As of 2015, 32 states have implemented a funding system that is based in part on students’ performance in at least some of their colleges. In such states, a portion of state funding is based on metrics such as the number of completed courses or the number of graduates.

Research shows that performance-based funding (PBF) has not moved the needle on degree completions in any substantial way. Our research focuses on the unintended consequences of such funding policies – whether colleges have responded to funding incentives in ways that could hurt disadvantaged students.

We find evidence that these systems may be reducing access for low-income students at public colleges.

Just a popular political strategy?

What is performance-based funding (PBF)? And does it improve college completion rates?

Performance funding, the idea of tying funding to outcomes instead of enrollment, was first adopted in Tennessee in 1979. It spread across the country in waves in the 1990s and 2000s, with some states dropping and adding programs as state budget conditions and political winds changed. In this decade, several states have implemented systems tying most or all of state funding to outcomes.

By basing funding on outcomes such as course completions and the number of degrees awarded, PBF has become a politically popular strategy to improve student outcomes. It has received strong support from the Bill and Melinda Gates and Lumina Foundations – two big players in the higher education landscape.

However, the best available evidence suggests that PBF systems generally do not move the needle on degree completions in any substantial way.

For example, a study of Washington state’s PBF program by Nick Hillman of Wisconsin, David Tandberg of Florida State and Alisa Hicklin Fryar of University of Oklahoma showed no effects on associate degree completion at two-year colleges. The study found positive effects on certificates in technical fields that took less time to complete, but those were the ones that were not as valuable in the labor market.

When Tandberg and Hillman conducted a nationwide study, they found no effect overall of PBF programs on degree completions at two-year and four-year colleges.

However, the small number of PBF programs that had been in effect for at least seven years (giving colleges plenty of time to change their practices in response) did appear to increase the number of bachelor’s degrees awarded by a few percentage points.

More selective and lower standards

While there is no significant evidence of impact, there have been many unintended consequences of this policy.

There is a growing body of evidence, for example, that shows that colleges may be trying to change both their student body and their academic standards in order to meet the state’s performance goals as well as their own priorities.

A research team at Teachers College who interviewed administrators in three states with “high-stakes” PBF systems (Indiana, Ohio and Tennessee) found that colleges facing PBF were both becoming more selective in accepting students and lowering academic standards among current students in an effort to have more students graduate.

A new study by Mark Umbricht and Frank Fernandez at Penn State and Justin Ortagus at University of Florida used data on incoming students to show that Indiana colleges increased selectivity in response to PBF.

They estimated that Indiana colleges lowered admissions rates by nearly 10 percent and increased ACT scores by nearly a full point compared to similar colleges in other states.

In our research, published recently in the Journal of Education Finance, we examined whether public two-year and four-year colleges nationwide changed how they either received or spent money in response to performance funding systems.

We found that colleges generally did not change spending on instruction or research, but they did see significantly less revenue from federal Pell Grants that are primarily given to students with family incomes below US$60,000 per year, suggesting fewer low-income students enrolled. We estimated a statistically significant decline in Pell revenue of about 2 percent at both two-year and four-year colleges.

We also found that four-year colleges offered more institutional grant aid, potentially in the form of merit-based scholarships to attract higher-income students with a greater likelihood of success.

Implications for policy

Although research suggests that performance funding systems have not been particularly effective in increasing the number of degrees that public colleges grant, the fact is that PBF is being adopted in more states. For example, five more states have adopted PBF since 2014, with additional states debating whether to adopt plans of their own.

We believe, this is unlikely to go away anytime soon.

And many states’ existing funding systems are highly inequitable. They favor research universities over less-selective colleges, even though less-selective colleges enroll the lion’s share of low-income students.

States should consider placing provisions in both their enrollment-based and performance-based funding systems to encourage colleges to continuing to enroll an economically diverse student body.

Several states, such as Arkansas, Ohio and Florida, provide additional incentives for graduating Pell Grant recipients. But states need to ensure that these additional funds are sufficient to encourage colleges to enroll academically qualified students from low-income families as well.

To do this, states would need to take three concrete steps. First, states should provide incentives for colleges to not raise admissions standards beyond what is needed to succeed in coursework. Second, they could also provide additional funds for graduating students who require a modest amount of remedial coursework (courses to build skills of less-prepared students), before taking college-level classes.

And finally, it is important that state policymakers and college leaders have honest conversations about the goals of PBF systems and what colleges need to improve their performance. This could help reduce the unintended outcomes.

What the Leading Republican Presidential Candidates Are Saying About College Affordability

With cumulative student loan debt exceeding $1.2 trillion and the average net price of college attendance continuing to rise, college affordability has become an important issue in the 2016 presidential election. Most of the attention on this topic has been in the Democratic primary, in which Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders and former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton both have ambitious plans to make public colleges either tuition-free (Sanders) or debt-free (Clinton) that have played a prominent role in their campaigns.

College affordability has played a much smaller role in the Republican primary to this point, with topics such as foreign policy and immigration getting far more attention from the candidates. Yet the rising price of college is likely to be an important issue in the general election, particularly among younger adults who tend to lean toward supporting Democratic candidates. Here, I examine the leading Republican candidates’ positions on how to make higher education more affordable for students and their families.

Donald Trump

The billionaire businessman and political novice has gained attention recently for his foray into for-profit higher education through the Trump Entrepreneur Initiative, which was previously known as Trump University before New York’s attorney general sued to stop Trump from using the term “university.” Trump is also facing lawsuits from former students who claimed that they got no value from their investment of up to $35,000 in real estate seminars.

In multiple interviews, Trump has stated his intention to either close or substantially downsize the U.S. Department of Education, although much of his rationale appears to be due to opposition to the Common Core standards at the K-12 level. In his only statement regarding higher education affordability, Trump has criticized the Department of Education for making a profit on the federal student loan program. Trump shares this view with many Democratic legislators, even though government agencies have different opinions about the profitability of student loans.

Sen. Marco Rubio

The first-term Florida senator has significant experience with higher education, having been an adjunct professor of political science at Florida International University between 2008 and 2015. In the Senate, Rubio has co-sponsored bipartisan legislation that would make income-based repayment the default option for federal student loans and would require colleges to report additional data on student outcomes. He has also co-sponsored a bipartisan bill that would open the federal financial aid program to alternative education providers that can meet certain outcome standards and gain accreditation, although he has also faced criticism for his defense of for-profit colleges whose access to federal funds has been threatened.

Rubio has also supported ideas that are likely to appeal to Republican primary voters but may not be as popular with independent-minded voters in a general election. Like Trump, Rubio has also called for the elimination of the Department of Education. Rubio has noted that some programs currently administered by the federal government should continue (such as the federal student loan program), but they could be absorbed by the Department of the Treasury or other agencies. He has sponsored legislation in the Senate to allow students to use private income share agreements, which function similarly to private loans with income-based repayment, to finance their education. This idea has been criticized as a form of indentured servitude, even though federal loans function in similar ways.

Sen. Ted Cruz

The first-term Texas senator has said relatively little about college affordability, other than noting that he just recently paid off his $100,000 in student loan debt. Like the other GOP candidates, he has called for the vast majority of the Department of Education to be eliminated. Cruz would appoint an Education Secretary whose sole goal would be to determine which programs should remain and give most funding to the states via block grants. In 2012, Cruz indicated that he would keep federal student aid funds in the federal budget, but transfer funding and authority to the states.

As Democrats will certainly keep at least 40 seats in the U.S. Senate (the minimum needed to sustain a filibuster to block legislation) and may gain a majority in this fall’s election, it doesn’t appear that the Department of Education will go away anytime soon. But if any of these three Republican candidates are elected, their actions on affordability—and the implications for both students and taxpayers—are likely to be quite different than what a Clinton or Sanders administration will be proposing.

Comments on New America’s Financial Aid Reform Plan

In the last few years, there have been a dizzying number of proposals put forth to reform the complex and confusing system of student financial aid in the United States. From a series of 16 proposals released in the 2012-13 academic year through the Gates Foundation’s Reimagining Aid Design and Delivery project to Sara Goldrick-Rab and Nancy Kendall’s proposal for a free two-year public college option to a host of financial aid reforms proposed by the 2016 presidential candidates, there is no shortage of ideas to reform financial aid. (And I’ve got plenty of ideas of my own.)

The newest thoughtful proposal to add to the mix comes from New America’s education team, many of whom have significant experience in state and/or federal higher education policy. In this proposal, “Starting from Scratch: A New Federal and State Partnership in Higher Education,” the New America team proposes completely throwing out the current federal financial aid system and replacing it with a federal/state partnership with maintenance of effort requirements for states and accountability requirements for colleges while requiring colleges and states to cover students’ unmet financial need. Below, I summarize some of the key pieces of the proposal that I like, some that I dislike, and some that require a lot of additional thought.

Things I like

(1) Unlike some of the other financial aid proposals out there, the New America proposal has provisions to go beyond public colleges and universities to cover at least a segment of private nonprofit and for-profit colleges. This is an important recognition, as all colleges that currently receive federal financial aid are public in one sense of the word. A financial aid system that only supports students attending public colleges could result in a stampede to public institutions, which could be a problem in states with historically small public sectors (such as in the Northeast).

(2) Plowing funds currently spent on tax credits and deductions into student financial aid isn’t a new idea (and New America raised it in 2013), but it makes perfect sense. Research has shown that tax credits and deductions have no effect on college enrollment or completion, likely because the money gets to students well after enrollment (assuming they remember to claim the funds on their tax return).

(3) I’m glad to see the New America team questioning the current definitions of both the cost of attendance (COA) and the expected family contribution (EFC). As I’ve shown in research with Sara Goldrick-Rab and Braden Hosch, the non-tuition portions of the COA are determined by colleges and vary drastically within the same geographic area. The EFC has been criticized as being an outdated formula that doesn’t adequately reflect a family’s ability to pay. I’d like to see New America dig in deeper on both of these areas.

Things I don’t like

(1) I’m generally uncomfortable with the idea of ‘maintenance of effort’ proposals that require states to keep a certain level of funding per full-time equivalent (FTE), as the New America plan does. As I’ve written about before, states tend to think about funding in terms of overall funding amounts (not on a per-FTE basis) because they don’t directly control enrollment levels. If this program shifts a larger percentage of enrollment to public colleges, required state funding levels for higher education will rise at the same time states are already legally or constitutionally required to fund other priorities. I also think that maintenance of effort requirements will result in states lobbying Congress to defeat this proposal (and I also think that states would opt out despite the authors’ insistence that it wouldn’t happen).

(2) I don’t like states choosing which colleges could receive financial aid under the partnership model. I would rather see all colleges that meet quality and accountability thresholds receive funding regardless of their state affiliation or tax status. It may very well be the case that fewer for-profits or private nonprofits meet the threshold, but as long as the threshold is justified, I’m fine with that. But excluding all non-public institutions immediately (and at the whim of state policymakers) doesn’t make sense to me.

(3) I’m concerned about getting rid of federal loans to cover the EFC, while simultaneously placing additional regulations on private loans. This could result in students not being able to get access to credit at reasonable interest rates, as private lenders may choose to not offer loans when students can discharge them via bankruptcy. I would much rather see an income share agreement or income-based repayment model encouraged for private loans in this case, as this gives both students and lenders some level of protection.

Unclear

(1) The New America proposal calls for states to have a larger role in holding colleges accountable for their outcomes. This makes sense for colleges that just operate in one state, but is far trickier for colleges that operate in multiple states. If this were to happen, groups like the National Council for State Authorization Reciprocity Agreements (NC-SARA) would become even more important.

(2) I’m concerned that colleges would try to game the funding system on account of the requirement that 25% of students qualify for Pell Grants under the current EFC formula. If a college already has 30% of students receiving Pell Grants and has funding tied to meeting outcomes, it suddenly has an incentive to recruit a few more higher-income students with a higher likelihood of graduation. Research that I’ve done with my Seton Hall colleague Luke Stedrak (look for it soon in the Journal of Education Finance) shows that colleges in states subject to performance-based funding received less Pell funding that colleges not subject to performance funding after controlling for a host of other characteristics. It might be worth tweaking the system to reduce the possibility of gaming.

I’d love to hear your thoughts on New America’s discussion-worthy proposal. Drop me a note or leave a comment below!

Comments on the Bush Higher Education Proposal

The three Democratic candidates for president all released their plans for higher education fairly early in the campaign cycle, with Sen. Clinton, Gov. O’Malley, and Sen. Sanders’s plans all including some variation of tuition-free or debt-free public college. These plans are all likely dead on arrival in Congress due to their price tags ($350 billion for the Clinton plan) and the high probability that Republicans hold the House of Representatives through 2020, but the candidates deserve credit for making higher education a key part of their domestic policy platforms.

On the Republican side, higher education has been much less important during the campaign, with only Sen. Rubio having a framework (with a good number of components that may enjoy bipartisan support) in place for higher education before now. But Gov. Bush’s newly released proposal for education reform (as summarized in this piece written by Jason Delisle and Andrew Kelly, two informal advisors to the Bush campaign and people I greatly respect) reflects the most detailed proposal from any of the Republican candidates. (Gov. Bush’s summary on Medium is available here.) And like Rubio’s plan, there are components that will likely get bipartisan support in Congress—while other parts are likely to face opposition from within his own party. Below are the key planks of Bush’s higher education platform, along with my comments on whether they are likely to be effective and feasible.

Proposal 1: Replace the current financial aid system with education savings accounts and a line of credit. If one thing unites all presidential candidates, it’s that the Free Application for Federal Student Aid needs to be either incredibly simple or eliminated. The Bush proposal would replace the FAFSA for most students with an education savings account based on the tax code. All students would get a $50,000 line of credit (roughly the same as what independent students can borrow for a bachelor’s degree today), and low-income students would get an additional account with need-based aid based on their family’s income in high school. Adults would also qualify for grant aid, likely by filling out some new version of the FAFSA. Tax credits would also disappear in the Bush proposal, which will probably upset some people although they have not been proven to induce students to enroll in or graduate from college.

This proposal represents a modest—but likely helpful—improvement over the current system for undergraduate students. This would give students at least some additional flexibility in using their financial aid, with the potential for students to accelerate their progress by taking summer courses that would not be aid-eligible under current rules. Getting students information about their likely aid eligibility in eighth grade is a plus, as shown in my research. But I’d like to see students get money deposited in their account at a slightly earlier age to make the commitment seem more tangible.

It appears that the $50,000 line of credit will be the new lifetime limit for federal student loans. For undergraduate students, this makes a lot of sense. The typical student with debt has between $30,000 and $35,000 in debt for a bachelor’s degree, so $50,000 seems like a reasonable upper bound for most students. However, it doesn’t look like graduate students would qualify for additional credit—which could curtail enrollment in master’s degree programs or doctoral programs in less-lucrative fields. This could create an opportunity for the expanded use of income share agreements with the private sector.

Proposal 2: Impose “risk sharing” on federal student loan dollars by holding colleges responsible for a portion of loans that are not repaid. The general principal of risk sharing makes sense—if a college’s former students can’t pay the bills, then the college should be responsible for partially reimbursing taxpayers. And the idea has at least some bipartisan support, as evidenced by 2015 legislation introduced by Senators Hatch (R) and Shaheen (D). But putting together a risk sharing proposal that doesn’t punish colleges for serving at-risk students while protecting taxpayer funds is far more difficult than it would first appear. I’ve tangled with some of these issues in my prior work (see my proposed framework for a risk sharing system), and the Bush team will have to do the same if their candidate pulls off an improbable comeback.

Proposal 3: Allow new providers to receive federal financial aid dollars. Right now, students can take their federal financial aid dollars to any of the approximately 7,500 colleges and universities nationwide that are eligible for and participate in programs under Title IV of the Higher Education Act. Conservatives have frequently called for other non-college providers (such as boot camps, apprenticeship programs, and single-course providers) to be eligible for federal financial aid to promote competition and potentially place downward pressure on the price tag of traditional programs. However, making this sort of change would likely require a significant overhaul of the current accreditation system, which has been deemed a cartel by some Republicans.

Bush’s proposal echoes these calls, but also proposes that prior learning assessments qualify for federal financial aid. This would allow students to use Pell Grant or student loan dollars to pay for taking tests such as the College Level Examination Program (CLEP) that can result in college credit if a student can demonstrate subject mastery. It could also potentially be used to help pay for portfolio assessments of previous academic or work experience, which can cost hundreds of dollars at some colleges. Even if the entire accreditation system isn’t blown to smithereens, a relatively modest change of allowing vetted prior learning assessment providers to accept federal aid would benefit students.

Proposal 4: Get outcome data into the hands of students and families. Florida has one of the most comprehensive education data systems in the country, allowing students and their families to access detailed data on earnings by field of study. The Bush proposal calls for each state to develop a similar system in order to provide outcome data to the public. However, given the way the pendulum has swung regarding student privacy (a substantial part of both the GOP and Democratic primary bases), it will be difficult to include incentives or sanctions that would encourage states to develop these databases. But even if such a proposal were to be adopted, it’s far from clear whether 50 separate databases would make more sense from a logistical or privacy perspective than a federal College Scorecard with program-level data.

Proposal 5: Reform the student loan repayment system. Both Republicans and Democrats seem to be moving toward a consensus that income-based repayment models (where loan payments are tied to a former student’s income and debt burden) are superior to the traditional 10-year fixed payment plan. Bush’s plan would make income-based repayment the only option for new borrowers, with payments equal to 1% of income per each $10,000 borrowed for up to 25 years, with the maximum lifetime payment being $17,500 per $10,000 borrowed. His proposal would also encourage current borrowers to shift into income-based repayment, which is currently a headache for many students. Although people will likely disagree with the exact terms Bush’s proposal sets forth, the general principles match up with conservative proposals as well as President Obama’s REPAYE program.

Although Gov. Bush is badly lagging in the polls, his campaign’s higher education proposals are serious, generally well-considered (although lacking for most details), and represent an important starting point for federal higher education policy discussions. Given that large infusions of federal funds into higher education are unlikely regardless of who becomes the next President, some pieces in the Bush plan (such as increased flexibility in how students use Pell Grants) are worth considering as low-cost plans that have the potential to positively impact students. Other ideas (such as risk sharing) sound promising in principle, but have the potential to do harm if they are improperly implemented. But even if the Bush campaign doesn’t make it past the first few primary states, many of the ideas included in the plan should be strongly considered by other candidates.

Should Students in “Boot Camps” Get Federal Financial Aid?

In the last several years, a number of companies have started short-term, intensive training programs in fields such as computer programming, Web design, and business designed to give fresh college graduates the skills they need to land lucrative jobs in growing fields. These “boot camps” include offerings by start-up companies such as Dev Bootcamp, General Assembly, and Koru as well as some entries from branches of traditional colleges (such as Rutgers). This sector is rapidly growing, with one organization estimating that about 16,000 students will complete coding boot camps in 2015.

Boot camps may tout their high job placement rates, but they are not cheap for students. The typical program costs about $11,000 for an 11-week program, although shorter options are often available in some fields. Unlike for most undergraduate and graduate programs through traditional colleges, these programs are currently not eligible for federal financial aid dollars. This means that students have two options to pay for these programs: paying out of pocket or taking out a private loan. However, the U.S. Department of Education is beginning an “experimental sites” program that will allow a small number of colleges to partner with unaccredited providers like boot camps to offer courses and receive federal financial aid.

Should students in boot camp programs be able to receive federal grants and loans? The best argument toward allowing students to receive federal funds for these programs (after a careful vetting process) is that it would allow students with modest financial means and little creditworthiness of their own to easily pay for some or all of these programs. These programs tend to recruit heavily from selective colleges with fewer low-income students (see the list of Koru’s partners), where ability to pay hasn’t been such a concern to this point. But as the sector expands to include colleges with more economic diversity, financing these programs could become a problem.

On the other hand, the highly vocational nature of these programs allows for different financing structures to make sense. This can happen through private loans focused on high-quality programs, which is the goal of the partnership between private lenders Skills Fund and six boot camps. Income share agreements are also a potential fit in this area, although I do have concerns about whether successful graduates would want to give up equity in themselves rather than just make loan payments. Finally, it remains to be seen whether boot camps themselves would actually be interested in going through certification and quality assurance processes that are likely to accompany federal student aid. For example, General Assembly’s co-founder told Inside Higher Ed that he didn’t want to receive federal student aid due to concerns about federal aid leading to higher prices in the future (the so-called “Bennett Hypothesis”). Others, such as Alex Holt at New America, have concerns about additional federal oversight leading to reduced program quality and less innovation.

I’ve thought about the dueling concerns of access and flexibility regarding boot camps, and I still don’t know exactly where I stand. The good thing here is that we’re likely to have a small number of programs get access to federal financial aid, so the effects of federal funding (and rules) can be examined before opening the spigot for more interested programs. I’d love to hear your thoughts on this question below, as this is a developing issue on which research badly needs to be conducted.

How Well Do Default Rates Reflect Student Loan Repayment?

This post initially appeared at the Brown Center Chalkboard blog.

The U.S. Department of Education released new data this week on colleges’ cohort default rates (CDR)—reflecting the percentage of a college’s former students with federal student loans who entered repayment in Fiscal Year 2012 and defaulted by the end of Fiscal Year 2014. The average CDR dropped to 11.8 percent in Fiscal Year 2012, down from 13.7 percent in FY 2011 and 14.7 percent in FY 2010. Eight colleges had a CDR over 30 percent for three consecutive years, subjecting them to the loss of all federal financial aid dollars. Over 100 additional colleges had a CDR over 30 percent in the 2012 cohort, putting them at risk of losing funds if their performance does not improve.

Yet although CDRs are important for accountability purposes, they do not necessarily reflect whether students are repaying their loans.  As of June 30, 2015, just over half of the $623 billion in Direct Loans made to students who have entered repayment are in current repayment. In addition to the $48 billion in loans in default, an additional $63 billion are more than 30 days delinquent and $180 billion are in deferment and forbearance. Deferment and forbearance are not always bad things, as students can qualify for either by being in the military or pursuing graduate studies. However, students can also request deferment and forbearance for economic hardship, while interest still accrues. The presence of income-based repayment plans, in which students making below 150 percent of the federal poverty line can make no payments while still remaining current on their loan, further complicates any analyses. All of these complications make cohort default rates a weak metric of whether students are actually paying back their loans.

Are students repaying their loans? A look using College Scorecard data

The Department of Education’s recent release of College Scorecard data provides new insights into whether students are repaying their loans, while also allowing for comparisons to be made to the current CDR metric. The Scorecard contains a new measure of the percentage of students whose student loan balance was lower than when entering repayment, which reflects the percentage of students who have been able to pay down at least some principal.

Using this new metric on declining student loan balances to compare with colleges’ CDRs, I come to three new findings.  Please note that for the purposes of this blog post, I consider the three-year cohort default rate for students who entered repayment in FY 2011 compared to the one-year and three-year repayment rates for students who entered repayment in FY 2010 and 2011. The key findings are below.

(1) Cohort default rates substantially underestimate the percent of students who have been unable to lower their loan balances. Of the nearly 5,700 colleges with data on both CDRs and repayment rates, the median college had a 14.9 percent three-year CDR while 40.8 percent of students did not repay any principal in the first three years after leaving college. This means that one in four exiting students was not in default, yet did not make a dent in their loan balance in the first three years after entering repayment. Figure 1 below shows the relationship between CDRs and repayment rates. A low CDR for a college is associated with higher rates of repayment (with a correlation coefficient of 0.76), but there are plenty of exceptions. For example, 25 percent of the colleges with default rates below 10% had more than one-fourth of all students failing to repay any principal.

brookings_fig1

(2) The percentage of students paying down principal doesn’t change much between one year and three years since entering repayment. One year after entering repayment, 62.8 percent of students at the median college had paid down at least $1 in principal, though that percentage dipped slightly to 59.2 percent within three years (see Figure 2 for the distribution of repayment rates). This drop is likely due to some students either falling behind on their payments while enrolled in the standard repayment plan as well as payments under income-based plans being insufficient to cover accumulating interest. In either case, stagnant or falling repayment rates should raise red flags regarding students’ ability to eventually pay off the loan within 10-20 years.

brookings_fig2

 

(3) As a whole, repayment outcomes make a turn for the worse at for-profit colleges compared with public or private nonprofit colleges. This can be best illustrated by showing the difference in repayment rates between one and three years of entering repayment by institutional type. As Figure 3 below shows, for-profit colleges tended to have lower repayment rates after three years than one year, a red flag that their borrowers are not doing well, while public and private nonprofit colleges saw similar repayment rates over time. Only one in four for-profit colleges had more students paying down principal three years after completion, which points to potential problems for students and taxpayers alike. Although for-profit colleges have somewhat lower CDRs than community colleges, community colleges do not see drops in the repayment rates that exist in the for-profit sector.

brookings_fig3

The new loan repayment rate data provides an additional tool   for policymakers to use when holding colleges accountable for their performance. Although this metric represents a substantial improvement over CDRs by including students who are struggling to make payments, the presence of income-based repayment plans (where students can stay current on their loans by making small payments if their income is sufficiently low) complicates any accountability efforts. Further research is needed to examine the implications of income-based repayment programs on principal repayment rates.

Which Colleges Enroll First-Generation Students?

The higher education world is abuzz over the Obama Administration’s Saturday morning release of a new College Scorecard tool (and underlying trove of data). In my initial reaction piece, I discussed some of the new elements that are available for the first time. Earnings of former students are getting the most attention (and have been frequently misinterpreted as being the earnings of graduates only), but today I am focusing on a new data element that should be of interest to students, researchers, and policymakers alike.

The Free Application for Federal Student Aid has included a question about the highest education level of the student’s parent(s), but this information was never included in publicly available data. (And, yes, the FAFSA application period will be moved up three months starting in 2016—and my research on the topic may have played a small role in it!) In my blog post on Saturday, I showed the distribution of the percentage of first-generation students (as defined as not having a parent with at least some college) among students receiving federal financial aid dollars. Here it is again:

firstgen

I dug deeper into the data to highlight the ten four-year public and private nonprofit colleges with the lowest and highest percentages of first-generation students (among those receiving federal aid) in 2013. The results are below:

Four-year private nonprofit colleges with the fewest first-generation students, 2013.
Name Pct First Gen
California Institute of Technology 5.9
Wheaton College (IL) 8.3
Oberlin College (OH) 8.5
Elon University (NC) 8.6
Dickinson College (PA) 9.0
Macalester College (MN) 9.1
University of Notre Dame (IN) 9.7
Carnegie Mellon University (PA) 9.8
Hobart William Smith Colleges (NY) 9.8
Rhode Island School of Design 10.6
Source: College Scorecard/NSLDS.
Note: Only includes students receiving Title IV aid, excludes specialty colleges.
Four-year public colleges with the fewest first-generation students, 2013.
Name Pct First Gen
College of William and Mary (VA) 13.2
University of Vermont 14.1
Georgia Institute of Technology 16.5
University of North Carolina School of the Arts 17.4
University of Virginia 17.6
New College of Florida 18.0
University of Michigan-Ann Arbor 18.0
SUNY College at Geneseo 18.4
Clemson University 18.5
University of Wisconsin-Madison 19.1
Source: College Scorecard/NSLDS.
Note: Only includes students receiving Title IV aid, excludes specialty colleges.

Just 5.9% of students receiving federal financial aid at the California Institute of Technology were defined as first-generation in 2013, and eight other private nonprofit colleges were under 10% (including Oberlin, Notre Dame, and Carnegie Mellon). The lowest public college was the College of William and Mary, where just 13% of students were first-generation. Several flagships check in on the list, including Vermont, Virginia, Michigan, and Wisconsin (where I got my PhD).

The list of colleges with the highest percentage of first-generation students is quite different:

Four-year private nonprofit colleges with the most first-generation students, 2013.
Name Pct First Gen
Colorado Heights University 75.6
Beulah Heights University (GA) 66.0
Heritage University (WA) 64.3
Grace Mission University (CA) 64.1
Hodges University (FL) 63.3
Humphreys College (CA) 60.5
Selma University (AL) 59.8
Mid-Continent University (KY) 59.7
Sojourner-Douglass College (MD) 59.2
University of Rio Grande (OH) 58.5
Source: College Scorecard/NSLDS.
Note: Only includes students receiving Title IV aid, excludes specialty colleges.
Four-year public colleges with the most first-generation students, 2013.
Name Pct First Gen
Cal State University-Los Angeles 64.0
Cal State University-Dominguez Hills 60.2
Cal State University-Stanislaus 60.2
Cal State University-San Bernardino 59.4
Cal State University-Bakersfield 58.2
University of Texas-Pan American* 56.9
University of Arkansas at Monticello 56.1
University of Texas at Brownsville* 55.2
Cal State University-Fresno 53.4
Cal State University-Northridge 53.1
Source: College Scorecard/NSLDS.
Note: Only includes students receiving Title IV aid, excludes specialty colleges.
* These two colleges are now UT-Rio Grande Valley as of Sept. 1.

Six private nonprofit and three public four-year colleges had at least three-fifths of their federal aid recipients classified as first-generation students, ten times the rate of Caltech. The top-ten lists for both public and private colleges include many minority-serving institutions, as well as a good chunk of the Cal State University System. These engines of social mobility deserve credit, as do some flagship institutions that do far better than average in enrolling first-generation students. UC-Berkeley, where 37% of aided students are first-generation, also deserves special commendation.

There are a lot of great data elements present in the College Scorecard data that go beyond earnings. I hope that they get attention from researchers and are disseminated to the public.

New Paper and Testimony on Risk Sharing

The concept of risk sharing, in which colleges are held at least partially financially responsible for the outcomes of their students, has become a hot topic of political discussion in recent months. The idea has gained bipartisan support–in least in theory–as presidential candidates Hillary Clinton and Scott Walker have both supported the basic principles of risk sharing. Yet by potentially penalizing colleges with high student loan default rates, risk sharing systems have the incentive to reduce access to higher education while not actually incentivizing colleges to improve.

With generous support from the Lumina Foundation, I set out to sketch out a risk sharing system with the goal of increasing accountability for poor outcomes while recognizing differences in the types of students colleges serve. I released the resulting paper this week and testified in front of the U.S. Department of Education’s Advisory Committee on Student Financial Assistance on the topic. (My testimony is below.) I welcome your comments on risk sharing, as the goal of this paper and testimony is to advance a thoughtful conversation on what a fair and effective system could look like.

For more reading on risk sharing, I highly recommend the thoughtful takes of the American Enterprise Institute’s Andrew Kelly and Temple University’s Doug Webber.

 

Testimony to the Advisory Committee on Student Financial Assistance

Hearing on Higher Education Act Reauthorization

Robert Kelchen

Good afternoon, members of the Advisory Committee on Student Financial Assistance, Department of Education officials, and other guests. My name is Robert Kelchen and I am an assistant professor in the Department of Education Leadership, Management and Policy at Seton Hall University. All opinions expressed in this testimony are my own, and I thank the Committee for the opportunity to present.

My testimony today will be on the topic of risk sharing in higher education, which is typically defined as holding colleges financially accountable for their students’ performance. It is a topic that has been discussed by politicians on both sides of the aisle, including legislation recently introduced by Republican Senator Orrin Hatch and Democratic Senator Jeanne Shaheen that would require colleges to pay a percentage of students’ loans that were not paid on in the previous year.[1] But simple risk sharing proposals like this provide colleges with incentives to reduce borrowing by either leaving the Direct Loan program or reducing non-tuition expense allowances included in the cost of attendance.

In a recently-released policy paper funded by the Lumina Foundation, I introduced a risk sharing proposal that attempts to hold colleges accountable for their performance with respect to both Pell Grant and federal student loan dollars.[2] My proposal would reward colleges for strong performance on Pell Grant success and student loan repayment rates, while requiring colleges with weaker performance to pay a penalty to the Department of Education from a source other than institutional aid dollars.

The federal government’s portion of my proposed risk-sharing system would have three main components:

  • First, penalties or rewards for Pell Grant recipients’ performances would be separate from penalties or rewards for student loan performance. This would end the current situation in which colleges face incentives to opt out of federal student loans in order to protect Pell Grant dollars.[3]
  • Second, the federal government would provide better tracking and reporting of outcomes for students receiving federal financial aid. The set of metrics available to examine performance is extremely limited, and could be improved by either overturning the ban on federal student unit record data systems or committing to providing additional subgroup performance information using IPEDS and the National Student Loan Data System.
  • Third, in order to make more accurate comparisons about student loan performance across campuses, federal guidelines for how the non-tuition components of the cost of attendance are defined would be helpful. Research has found large variations in the off-campus room and board and other expense allowances, which are determined by individual colleges, within a given metropolitan area.[4] Colleges need to be placed on a more level playing field for accountability purposes.

Colleges would be required to meet three criteria to receive Title IV funds:

  • First, colleges must agree to put “skin in the game” by being willing to match a percentage of Title IV loan or grant aid with institutional funds if their performance falls below a specified benchmark.
  • Second, colleges must participate in the Federal Direct Loan program in order for their students to receive Pell Grant dollars, giving students access to credit while not directly putting Pell dollars at risk.
  • Third, colleges must be willing to meet heightened accreditation and consumer information provision standards.

Colleges’ performance would be compared to similar institutions using peer groups based on the characteristics of students served, types of degrees and certificates offered, and the level of resources different colleges possess. Notably, by using institutional selectivity, per-student revenues, and endowment values as grouping characteristics, a college would be compared to more selective colleges if it tried to become more selective—limiting its ability to game the system.

The Pell Grant portion of risk sharing would be based on outcomes such as Pell recipients’ retention rates, graduation rates, transfer rates, and the number of graduates. Colleges with performance a certain percentage below the peer group average would have to pay a penalty equal to a percentage of Pell funds awarded out of their own budget, while colleges a certain percentage above the average would receive a bonus to use to supplement need-based financial aid programs.

The student loan portion of risk sharing would be based on outcomes such as cohort default rates 3-5 years after entering repayment, the percent of students current on their payments, and the percentage of students making payments of at least $1 of principal. I would also include PLUS loans in the risk sharing metric. Colleges performing substantially above the peer group average would get additional work-study funds, while colleges performing substantially below average would face a penalty.

The implementation of any risk sharing proposal must be carefully considered in order to avoid perverse incentives and to gain support from colleges and policymakers. Lessons from state performance-based funding program show that implementing over a period of several years is important, as is some method for colleges to limit penalties until they can change their organization.[5] Colleges that can present clear plans for improvement that are supported by their accreditor should be able to get reduced penalties and logistical support from the federal government for a limited period of time.

Thank you once again for the opportunity to present and I look forward to answering any questions.

[1] Student Protection and Success Act (S. 1939, introduced August 5, 2015). http://www.shaheen.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Student%20Protection%20and%20Sucess%20Act.pdf.

[2] The paper is available at http://www.luminafoundation.org/resources/proposing-a-federal-risk-sharing-policy.

[3] Hillman, N. W. (2015). Cohort default rates: Predicting the probability of federal sanctions. Educational Policy, 29(4), 559-582. Hillman, N. W., & Jaquette, O. (2014). Opting out of federal student loan programs: Examining the community college sector. Paper presented at the Association for Education Finance and Policy annual conference, San Antonio, TX.

[4] Kelchen, R., Hosch, B. J., & Goldrick-Rab, S. (2014). The costs of college attendance: Trends, variation, and accuracy in institutional living cost allowances. Madison, WI: Wisconsin HOPE Lab.

[5] For example, see Dougherty, K. J., & Natow, R. S. (2015). The politics of performance-based funding: Origins, discontinuations, and transformations. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press.

Who Would Use Income Share Agreements to Pay for College?

This post first appeared at the Brookings Institution’s Brown Center Chalkboard blog.

In response to concerns over the rising price of college and increasing amounts of student loan debt, the Obama Administration has worked to expand income-based repayment programs for those with federal student loans. In late 2015 or early 2016, the U.S. Department of Education will likely allow students with any federal loans to enroll in a more-generous version of income-based repayment that would cap monthly payments at 10 percent of discretionary income (i.e., earnings above 150 percent of the federal poverty line) for 20 years for undergraduate students and 25 years for graduate students, with any remaining balances forgiven by the federal government.

Although this new version of income-based repayment has the potential to benefit up to six million Americans with student loan debt, concerns have been raised about this more generous program. First, the price tag is estimated at $15.3 billion over 10 years, or roughly 5 percent of forecasted Pell Grant expenditures during this period. Second, graduate students, who are more likely to have six-figure student loan debt and enroll in income-based repayment programs at higher rates, will see more benefits than undergraduate students with smaller amounts of debt but worse career options. Finally, as more students enroll in income-based repayment plans, colleges have fewer reasons to control costs due to students’ ability to access credit.

An interesting alternative to federal student loans that has emerged in recent years has the potential to shift the financial risk of paying for college away from the federal government and students, instead placing the risk in the private sector. Income share agreements (ISA) function somewhat similarly to income-based repayment plans, as students pledge to pay a predetermined percentage of their annual income in exchange for funds to pay for college. However, unlike federal income-based repayment plans, the percentage of income and the length of the repayment period are negotiated between a private investor and the student instead of being the same across all students. Students who major in economically desirable fields, such as engineering and business, at top colleges are likely to get better repayment terms than students majoring in less-profitable but socially important fields, such as education and nursing, at more typical colleges.

Given the current generosity of income-based repayment programs—and the likelihood that the federal government loses money on many students today—I have to wonder how many students would use ISAs once potential legal issues around their operation in the United States are resolved. Students in less-lucrative fields or those who plan to work in public service careers are unlikely to get better terms from the private sector than the federal government. These students would be likely to continue using federal student loans, although it is possible that ISAs could partially replace Parent PLUS loans as a financing source should parents not want to take out loans for their children when ISAs are available.

This leaves two groups of students who are likely to be interested in ISAs. The first group is those students who are either attending colleges that do not offer their students federal loans (primarily for-profit colleges and community colleges), or those attending short-term training programs such as coding ‘boot camps’ that do not currently qualify for federal student aid. Something in the neighborhood of two million students attend these colleges and programs, which results in a fairly sizable market. However, all of these programs tend to be relatively inexpensive, meaning that the per-student profit for an ISA provider will be fairly small.

The group of students who would be more lucrative for ISA providers would be those students enrolled in profitable degree programs at traditional undergraduate and graduate institutions. Because these programs tend to be expensive, the contract would need to be designed so the provider could make a profit on a large initial investment. However, students could lock in paying a lower percentage of their income than what they would expect to pay under income-based repayment if their expected earnings are high enough.

But students with high expected incomes may stay away from ISAs because they may expect to pay more in an ISA than under the standard federal repayment plan (a fixed monthly payment over 10 years). It would be difficult for ISA providers to undercut the federal government’s price in today’s environment of reasonably low interest rates, but it could be possible for students who have the highest likelihood of graduating and making a large salary because of the relatively low risk these students represent to a provider. Additionally, the presence of post-graduation private loan refinancing options such as Earnest and SoFi give successful graduates a way to lower their loan payments without giving up a share of their income.

Income share agreements have the potential to create another option for students looking to pay for college while seeking assurances they will not be overwhelmed by future payments. However, given the current generosity of federal income-based repayment programs and the likely hesitation of those who expect six-figure salaries to sign away a percentage of their income for years to come, the market for these programs may be somewhat limited. However, the federal government should encourage the development of private ISA providers in order to give students as many options as possible to finance their education while setting reasonable parameters for their operation that protect students from fraud and abuse.